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CHAPTER 4 
JUSTICE: 
1850S SAN FRANCISCO AND THE 
CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH 
 
Punishment is not the evil that some academic elites would paint it, but rather is the 
linchpin to the benefits of social cooperation that are the root of human success. To follow the 
lead of the antipunishment fantasizers is to invite collapse like that we see in every 
antipunishment community in chapter 3. 
But that is only the starting point of punishment’s interesting story. Giving violators more 
punishment than they deserve also can undermine the benefits of cooperative action. 
Overpunishment converts the noble imposition of justice into an unprincipled mugging. Chapter 
5 will illustrate and explore this dynamic. 
At the same time, imposing markedly less punishment than what a violator deserves 
creates disaffection and acrimony that also can subvert cooperation. In other words, it is not 
punishment that is needed to maintain social cooperation, but justice. That is the subject of the 
present chapter. 
Punishment requires only the imposition of suffering for a rule violation, but justice 
requires much more: that the sanction reflect the extent of the offender’s moral blameworthiness 
for his violation, taking account of both the seriousness of his offense and his culpability and 
capacities in committing it. It requires an assessment of what reasonably could have been 
expected from this person in this situation. Could he, should he, have avoided committing the 
offense? 
While the nuance required by such an inquiry may be possible in the quiet and safety of a 
modern courtroom, is it realistic to think that those caught in the often impossible circumstances 
of absent-law situations could be expected to show such subtlety in judgment? Perhaps justice is 
a luxury that an absent-law group cannot afford; perhaps punishment is the best they can do. 
That is, perhaps the nicety of tying the amount of punishment to the degree of the offender’s 
blameworthiness must await the civilizing influence of governmental law? 
Or perhaps the reality is just the reverse: Left to their own devices, human groups 
naturally insist not only on punishment but on just punishment. And it is modern governmental 
law that has lost its way and disconnected punishment and justice—in the name of efficient 
crime control or some other utilitarian interest—in order to impose punishment that is not 
deserved, and to forgo punishment that is. 
The 1800s were a politically turbulent time for the California region.1 It had been a 
Spanish colony but was now a state in the Mexican Republic. Seeing an opportunity to gain 
control of much of the North American continent, President James Polk in 1846 sent a small 
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force to claim the West for the United States. Fearing British retaliation, Polk needed the action 
to seem the will of the locals, so on June 14, his force arrived at the home of California’s leading 
citizen, Don Mariano Vallejo. Vallejo, a Mexican general currently out of favor with the 
Mexican government and in command of no troops, remained the nominal military authority in 
this northern frontier. (What troops there were in the region were elsewhere and under the 
command of a rival general.) The party informed the general that he was a prisoner. Vallejo, who 
had been asleep, “had difficulty understanding what war he was a prisoner of.” The group sat in 
Vallejo’s home, drank local brandy, and wrote a formal statement of terms, and “by its third 
paragraph, the product of good native liquor, the California Republic was born.”2  
While President Polk had put the takeover in motion, the region could not be admitted 
into the United States without congressional action, and this was a touchy issue. California was 
against slavery. An additional free state would numerically put the slaveholding states at a 
disadvantage. The result was an awkward limbo. Congress would not vote California into the 
Union, but it was thought too vital to American interests to let others control the area. 
Soon after, in 1848, the discovery of gold brought 300,000 men to California from all 
over the world. Yet this sudden mass of humanity lived without a functioning legal system. And 
if there had been a legal enforcement system, it was unclear what law it would enforce. Richard 
Mason, who had been appointed governor of the few permanent inhabitants, wrote to an alcalde 
(a type of local magistrate): 
 
Having only been two days in office as governor, I am not at this time prepared to 
say what are the extent of your powers and jurisdiction as alcalde; you must, for the time 
being, be governed by the customs of laws of the country as far as you can ascertain 
them, and by your own good sense and sound discretion.3 
 
Without a functional government, there were no licensing procedures, fees, or taxes to 
regulate gold prospecting. No miner worked land that he owned. Any prospector could join any 
mining camp at any time. 
Camp populations were heterogeneous: “Puritans and drunkards, clergymen and convict, 
honest and dishonest, rich and poor.”4 There was no common language, culture, or legal 
experience. The system of law an individual miner lived under prior to the camps was now only 
a private memory. Previous life credentials, whether social, educational, moral, or economic 
standing, were now irrelevant. No one worked for anyone else, and no one needed anyone else’s 
permission to mine a location. 
The men shared a common set of needs, however. Each miner needed to be able to leave 
whatever he owned unguarded each day while he worked his claim. A miner who found gold 
needed to protect his find until he could convert it into cash or goods. Mary Floyd Williams, who 
was born in California to a father who worked the mines, described the common scene: 
 
Thousands of gold seekers, constantly keyed to the highest pitch of excitement, 
gather in mountain camps far from the nearest office of government, generally 
unacquainted with the customs prevailing in the older settlements, and perfectly aware 
that there was no executive strong enough to enforce order, no police empowered to 
make arrest, and no jails where the lawless could be confined.5 
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As the camps sprang up in the hills of the Sierra Nevada, a set of community norms 
commonly emerged, much as occurred among Bob Ellickson’s farmers and ranchers of Shasta 
County (chapter 1), but here they did so without the cocoon of a functioning criminal justice 
system. There was no one beyond themselves to deal with violators of those norms, even if the 
conflict escalated into violence. 
In one camp, for example, it was agreed that each person was entitled to a ten-foot-square 
claim upon which to work. One miner accused another of encroachment and “appeal[ed] to the 
crowd.” The group measured off the claim and agreed that there had been encroachment. It was 
determined that the encroachment was accidental, hence no punishment was given. 
Tools left at a site stood as notice that the claim was active. In one instance, an Irishman 
and a Dutchman were accused of stealing an old shovel and pick that they thought abandoned. 
As it happened, the tools were marking a claim and by taking them, the two were effectively 
depriving the miners of their claim. As with the encroachment case, however, the group judged 
that intent mattered: The offenders honestly believed that no claim had been marked. The two 
were expelled from the camp rather than killed—the usual penalty for tampering with another’s 
claim—and the owners of the claim were advised to leave better tools to mark their claim in the 
future. 
The evolved norms included rules of property ownership over even complex issues. 
Howard Shinn, a reporter whose beat was the mining camps of the region, explained:6 
 
Labor serves as the title of ownership in the gold mines. If men combine their 
labor to turning the course of a river, and “their intentions are made known, and the 
improvement staked out, no person intrudes upon the ground. . . . The adventurers, 
therefore, hold their rights as securely as if they were protected by a charter from the 
Government.”7 
 
Justice by necessity operated quickly, with “no lawyers to delay—no petty technicalities 
to obstruct the course.”8 Prompt adjudication of criminal cases was important for several 
reasons: There were no jails or guards; thus, suspects could not be detained, and any camp might 
disappear overnight if gold was located elsewhere. Trials often occurred within moments of the 
discovery of a crime. The accused was guarded by men with revolvers or was tied to a tree. 
Sentences were executed immediately. “If it was considered safe to give the guilty man another 
chance, he was punished, usually by whipping, and driven from the camp with the warning that 
reappearance would mean death.”9 
The seriousness of the offense determined the size of the group that would hear the case. 
The members of a camps adjudicated small crimes by themselves: “The case was submitted to 
the assemblage without argument, and irrevocably decided viva voce.”10 But “in matters of 
greater moment the halloo was sounded from ridge to ridge, and a general gathering from a 
larger district was summoned for careful discussion and deliberation.”11 With a problem that 
could not be easily resolved, a “presiding officer and a judge impaneled a jury of six or twelve 
persons, summoned witnesses, and proceeded to a trial forthwith.”12  
With time, life in the mining camps became more formalized. The camps often elected 
alcaldes—borrowing the word from the old Mexican system—who served as a first resource in 
settling disputes. In one instance, a man named Sim ejected Sprenger, his mining partner, from 
their claim when an injury left Sprenger temporarily unable to work the claim. Sim did not 
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compensate Sprenger for his half of the claim, his half of the tools, or the work he had done. 
When Sprenger objected, Sim took the case to Rogers, the local alcalde, paying him a bribe to 
decide the case in his favor. 
Upon hearing of the unfair verdict, Sprenger appealed to the group for justice. Despite the 
cost to them in taking time away from their mining, the camp sent word out across the hills 
calling other miners to their camp. The miners gathered and demanded that the alcalde hold a 
jury trial for Sprenger. When he refused, saying his ruling was final, the miners asked: “Who but 
the people made this damned scoundrel alcalde anyhow? We can organize our own court of 
appeals.” Word was spread over a greater area that “a great wrong had been done, and that it was 
desired to examine the entire subject with all fairness and deliberation, sustaining or reversing 
the former judgement as the evidence should warrant.”13 Shinn reports, 
 
Every man of them all suffered a loss, by his day’s idleness, of whatever his work 
that day would have earned—perhaps five dollars, perhaps fifty dollars; but the miners of 
Jackson Creek were willing to suffer the loss if justice, as between man and man, could 
thereby be established.14 
 
The group elected a miner named Hayden to the position of chief judge. Hayden asked 
that a clerk and a sheriff be elected. When alcalde Rogers refused to provide the court records of 
the case, it was decided that the case would simply be heard again—this time before a jury. The 
judge instructed the jury that “they must strip the case of technicalities, regarding no law but 
right and wrong, no test but common-sense.”15 The jury decided the case for Sprenger. Sim was 
required to pay the costs of Sprenger’s illness, restore Sprenger as a full partner, and let him 
move back into their cabin. Sim was convicted of bribery. A mob formed around alcalde 
Rogers’s cabin. Judge Hayden convinced the miners to spare his life, but the corrupt alcalde lost 
his job and several tools, which the court seized. 
Richard J. Oglesby, who worked in several mining camps, later recalled: 
 
There was very little law, but a large amount of good order; no churches, but a 
great deal of religion; no politics, but a great deal of politicians; no offices, and, strange 
to say for my countrymen, no office-seekers. Crime was rare, for punishment was certain 
. . . . I now remember Charley Williams whack three of our fellow-citizens over the bare 
back, twenty-one to forty strokes, for stealing a neighbor’s money. The multitude of 
disinterested spectators had conducted the court. My recollection is that there were no 
attorney’s fees or court charges. I think I never saw justice administered with so little loss 
of time or at less expense. There was no more stealing in Nevada County until society 
became more settled and better regulated.16 
 
When the men of the mining camps faced a world without governmental law, they made 
their own. They had little choice. They could not proceed with their daily lives without some 
cooperative system of agreed-upon rules and a mechanism to enforce them. Yet what they 
invented was not just a system of punishment for violations but one that sought, within the terms 
of their situation, to do justice. While they had all given up their former lives to come to the 
mining camps to search for gold and become rich, at the exclusion of nearly all else in the lives, 
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they nonetheless made time to do justice, even if the case were one that had nothing to do with 
them, or even their own camp. 
As the miners labored in the hills, the residents of San Francisco, back at the point of 
entry for most of the miners, were having to deal with a similar but slightly different problem. 
San Francisco was the base camp for the gold rush. More than 150,000 men passed 
through San Francisco on their way to the mountain mines. The dynamic, chaotic population was 
beyond the control of the few existing officials.  In 1846 the town had had a population of 200.17 
The people of San Francisco had neither law nor the capacity to enforce it. 
Understanding the city’s vulnerable situation, a criminal gang calling themselves the 
Hounds began raiding stores and restaurants, who were “forced to supply their demands and 
‘charge it to the Hounds.’”18 One Sunday in July 1849, the Hounds were especially violent in 
their activities, beating everyone they robbed and shooting one victim. Several townspeople 
called for a meeting to deal with the violence. Within days, a self-formed committee of citizens 
took most of the Hounds into custody. A second meeting was called to decide their fate. During 
this meeting, a court and a grand jury were formed, and the Hounds were “indicted, and charged 
with a conspiracy to commit murder, robbery, etc.”19 The court, consisting of a judge, a jury, and 
attorneys to prosecute and defend the Hounds, ultimately convicted the men, sentenced them to 
exile, and threatened with execution any who returned. 
Such mass meetings and popular tribunals became the accepted means of criminal justice 
in San Francisco. The citizens appointed an alcalde, as the miners did in their camps. As in the 
camps, justice was swift. In a common sort of case in 1850, a “burglary occurred at four o’clock 
on an April morning. The alcalde issued warrants for the thieves. They were pursued, arrested, 
indicted by a grand jury, convicted by a petit jury, sentenced, whipped, and turned out of town 
within twelve hours.”20 No doubt errors were made under such procedures, but with no effective 
alternative, the system seemed to the citizens better than either rampant lawlessness or outraged 
lynch mobs. 
On October 18, 1850, California was officially admitted to the United States. In 
consequence, a number of political offices were created. Those who ran for office in the first 
election commonly had little interest in staying in the West, as was true of many if not most 
people there. Many sought to use the “position solely as a means of obtaining money for a 
speedy return to the East.”21  
Before these governmental officials, the “courts of the people” were rough justice but 
difficult to manipulate on a large scale because judges and attorneys appointed by the group 
changed from case to case. The new courts, however, filled with men of dubious histories, 
without oversight and with little motivation to serve the community, became “notorious for their 
failure to convict and punish criminals, especially those who [could] pay for skillful defense. . . . 
This immunity [was] almost universally attributed to flagrant corruption within professional 
circles.”22 
Before statehood, a trial would have been held by interested neighbors soon after a crime 
had occurred. The new system transferred the responsibility for doing justice to a physically and 
emotionally remote authority, usually long delayed from the offense. By 1851, the crime rate had 
skyrocketed. In response, citizens returned to what they knew worked, forming a Vigilance 
Committee. Every man in the city was invited to join. The group elected officers, kept records, 
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placed police on the streets and patrol boats in the harbor. Members also acted as detectives, 
jailers, lawyers, judges, and juries. 
The Vigilance Committee heard hundreds of cases. They hung four men, all of whom 
were convicted of, at minimum, murder and robbery. Persons convicted of robbery, and some 
lesser crimes, were transported on ships out of the area or simply banished. The Committee 
confronted innkeepers who were known to aid criminals and warned them to stop giving quarter 
to such persons or they would be shut down. One man convicted of possession of stolen property 
was whipped.  
In openly working against what they saw as corrupt authorities, the committee soon 
found its own members on trial by those authorities. Several were convicted by the official 
courts, but the enormous public uproar that followed caused the authorities to back down, and 
the convicted men were never sentenced. Their convictions served only to draw hundreds of new 
members to the Vigilance Committee and its work. 
With the Committee back in action, the crime rate again dropped. When new elections 
were held, with the election of men who were more invested in the long-term good of the 
community, the Vigilance Committee disbanded itself. 
The experience of the gold miners and the San Francisco residents nicely illustrates 
what we have seen in earlier chapters: In the absence of governmental law, people naturally 
organize themselves, creating their own group norms and mechanisms to enforce them. The 
shared norms can include even complex and nuanced matters—recall the group’s rules governing 
the rights of miners who join to move a stream in order to mine its bottom, or governing the 
proper treatment of a mining partner temporarily unable to work because of an injury. 
But these natural experiments also illustrate some new principles, such as the importance 
that people place on doing justice. Everything else in a gold miner’s life was set aside—family, 
friends, romance, career, education, leisure—yet it was understood within the camp that all 
mining would be set aside to do justice, even when the wrongdoing did not involve the entire 
group and even if it involved another group entirely. Miners from a large surrounding area would 
lay down their tools to join in an assembly adjudicating a serious case. The same devotion to 
doing justice is apparent in the San Francisco experience. In the pre-statehood absence of 
governmental law and in the face of post-statehood ineffective or corrupt government, the people 
joined to form vigilance committees to do justice even though this exposed them to a risk of 
physical harm and legal prosecution. And they did this even when they were not the victims of 
the crimes or even likely to be. 
In other words, doing justice is not just another mild preference that people have. And 
failures of justice are not just another point on the long list of minor disappointments that people 
have about their lives—which is the way many intellectual elites seek to trivialize it. For 
laypersons, failures of justice can cause deep disappointment and even dramatic upset. The 
woman outraged by the light sentence for her husband’s killer reported it made her physically ill, 
“sick to my stomach.”23 People shocked by a justice failure have complained that it is 
“absolutely unconscionable,”24 it “keeps me up at night,”25 “it’s a travesty,”26 “it’s unbelievable. 
. . . We’re devastated,”27 “it’s insanity.”28 The upset over a justice failure may be even more 
exaggerated for a victim: “I will forever live with this shadow.”29 “There’s a sea of emotions 
I’ve had since this happened. . . . I find [the sentence] very insulting.”30 A rape victim explained 
she will “be forever marked” by the crime and the case’s “embittering conclusion.”31  
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To laypeople, justice is not just one more policy preference but rather a necessary 
prerequisite for having their world right. 
This inherent human valuing of having justice done can be seen in the social science 
laboratory, even where the testing involves only the mildest of norm violations. In a type of 
experiment called the “ultimatum game,” participants are paired and one person is given a sum 
of money. The person must give some portion of the money to the other but has complete 
discretion as to how much. But if the amount offered is rejected by the receiver, then neither 
person gets to keep any of the money. If the amount is accepted, then both people get to keep 
their respective agreed-upon amounts. 
A purely efficient calculation presumably would lead the “recipient” to accept any 
amount offered—something is better than nothing. But this is not the typical pattern of response. 
The recipient is making a fairness judgment. Offers of less than 20 percent of the total are 
typically rejected,32 and even offers of a third of the total are rejected by a majority of 
receivers,33 even if large sums of money are involved. 
The attitude may be that there is no reason why the first person should get any more than 
the second—it was just by chance that the first person was selected to be the giver rather than the 
receiver—so the proper and fair division should be equal, but perhaps with some adjustment to 
acknowledge the “luck” of the person picked to be the giver. However, an attempt by the giver to 
“take advantage of the situation” by offering an unfair share too far from an equal division is 
seen as wrong.  
And people do not just feel that small offers are wrong in some intellectual sense. They 
feel strongly enough about it that they are willing to sacrifice their own money to deprive the 
wrongdoer of his. That is, they are personally willing to sacrifice to have the wrongdoer suffer 
for his wrongdoing.34 
Even more remarkable is the conduct of third-party observers of these interactions. Third-
party observers—who have nothing at stake in the transaction—are inclined to punish those who 
they think are acting unfairly. Even more striking, the third-party observers are willing to punish 
the wrongdoers even if it means that they, the observer, must bear the cost of the punishment! 
This dynamic is shown in a variation of the game in which both persons are given an 
initial allotment and both can give any portion of it to the other. In this variation, each person can 
keep any portion that they do not give away, but each gets three times any amount they are given 
by the other person. Thus, they can each maximize their take by giving their full allotment to the 
other person, in which case each will get to keep three times their initial allotment.35 But the 
players must make the allocation decision without knowing whether the other person will 
reciprocate. Can they trust the other person to contribute their full allotment? A person might 
give the other nothing, thereby keeping their full allotment and also collecting three times the 
allotment the other person gives them. The safe course is to give nothing, which lets the person 
at least keep what he or she has. In the studies, however, people are in fact more likely to 
contribute than not, as our prior discussions on cooperation would predict. They choose trust and 
cooperation over pure self-interest.36 
But our current interest in this experiment is in the reaction of a third-party observer. The 
observer is given her own allocation of money, which she can keep for herself or can use to 
punish one of the two people after she sees how they deal with the other. Every dollar she spends 
to punish a player causes the punished person to lose three dollars. 
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A purely self-interested third-party observer would just keep her full allocation. She gains 
no tangible benefit from imposing punishment and suffers a clear tangible loss by imposing it. 
And the observer has no personal stake in the interaction between the two people she is 
observing.  
Yet when third-party observers see one person taking advantage of another, they 
commonly pay to punish that person. When one person transfers his allotment to the other while 
the other keeps his for himself (thus getting to keep his own and three times what the other 
person gave him), almost half of the third-party observers pay to punish that selfish person. On 
average, the third-party observers pay more than a third of their money to punish wrongdoers.37 
The results illustrate in a tangible way the common desire to punish what is perceived as 
wrongdoing, even if the person is not the victim and even if the punishment is personally costly 
and provides no present or future tangible benefit.38 
The larger point is that human nature is to give deserved punishment. People commonly 
act as if doing justice provides them a benefit in itself, or as if seeing wrongdoing go unpunished 
imposes an intangible cost on them. And the science suggests that in a sense it does impose a 
cost. 
The human desire to give wrongdoers the punishment they deserve is more than just a 
social preference; it seems to have a biological component.39 In an experiment similar to the 
“ultimatum game” variations described above, researchers used brain scan technology to see 
what areas of the brain were at work when participants in the experiments were making their 
decisions during the game.40 They found that when people imposed punishment on those who 
were perceived as having acted badly, an area of the brain called the caudate nucleus was 
activated. The area is associated with reward sensations and is also activated, for example, when 
processing visual beauty, experiencing romantic love, and during periods of cocaine or nicotine 
consumption.41  
With brain scans we can witness the biological rewards from doing justice. Is it any 
surprise that we seek it out in plays, films, books, and all manner of entertainment? Clint 
Eastwood’s Dirty Harry movies and Charles Bronson’s Death Wish series, both wildly 
successful, are built around the protagonist personally correcting the justice failures of an 
ineffective legal system. And the delayed-justice-finally-done theme is seen in classics such as 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, Alexander Dumas’s Count of Monte Cristo, F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The 
Great Gatsby, and in modern books by many of today’s most popular writers, including Tom 
Clancy (Without Remorse), Lee Child (Die Trying), John Grisham (A Time to Kill), and Stephen 
King (Carrie). 
The saga of the gold miners and the citizens of 1850s San Francisco holds another 
important lesson about human nature: It is not the simple punishment of wrongdoing to which 
humans seem devoted, but rather the just punishment of wrongdoing. It would have been easy 
enough to authorize some strongman to punish all violators, but we see instead the groups 
willingly incurring the costs of group adjudication to assure that the punishment reflects their 
shared norms. In the camps, recall that the more serious the charge, and thus the more serious the 
potential penalty, the larger the group called for to adjudicate the case—that is, the greater the 
costs willingly incurred to assure proper liability and punishment. 
 
 
Robinson  03-20-2014 
 84 
And the adjudications commonly demonstrate a sensitivity to differences in an offender’s 
degree of blameworthiness. Recall the mining claim encroachment that was judged not 
intentional. The encroachment was corrected but not punished. Similarly, the Vigilance 
Committee did not blindly punish all rule breakers but rather shaped its punishments to match 
the relative seriousness of the offense: Murderers were hanged, robbers were permanently 
banished, and those who received stolen property were whipped but allowed to remain. It was 
not a desire for suffering of all rule breakers that drove the adjudications but the desire to impose 
what the community saw as just punishment. 
Modern studies confirm that it is moral blameworthiness—the relative amount of 
punishment an offender deserves for his wrongdoing—that people use in assessing the proper 
amount of punishment, not something else, such as deterring future crime or keeping dangerous 
people off the streets. Certainly people want to be safe, but that preference does not negate our 
innate desire that punishment be just. People’s intuitive human rules call for wrongdoers to be 
punished according to their blameworthiness, not based on sterile crime control calculations. 
In one set of studies, for example, subjects were asked to assess punishment for a variety 
of different cases, with no indication of what principle they should look to in doing so. They 
were then asked to again “sentence” the same cases but in this instance to use specific principles: 
one principle based punishment on the offender’s moral blameworthiness for the past offense 
(his “desert”), another based it on what would best deter others in the future (“general 
deterrence”), and another based it on an offender’s dangerousness and what was needed to best 
protect society from him in the future (“incapacitation”). The subjects’ undirected assessment of 
punishment matched their “desert” assessment and conflicted with their “general deterrence” and 
“incapacitation” assessments. That is, left to their own devices, people look to deserved 
punishment for the past crime, not to efficiency in future crime control. 
Other studies have looked at the kind of information subjects ask for or rely upon in 
making punishment judgments. As above, the studies find that people seek and rely upon 
information relevant to desert, not information relevant only to deterrence and dangerousness. 
The seriousness of the offense is central to people’s assessment of the punishment deserved, 
along with a wide range of other factors relating to an offender’s culpable state of mind, mental 
capacities, and other mitigating circumstances under which they acted. People do not normally 
look to factors such as the perpetrator’s prior record or likelihood of future violence (which are 
used to predict future dangerousness) or the detection rate for the offense, the frequency of the 
crime, or the degree of publicity for the case (which are used in setting sanctions that will more 
efficiently deter). Instead, the subjects rely on specific information related to how 
“blameworthy” an offender is.42 
The human tendency to want justice done, apparent in the gold rush era of 1840s–1850s 
California, can be seen in how people handle themselves in a wide range of absent-law situations 
in different eras and different places. 
During World War II, the Nazis transported Jews from all over Europe into camps that 
had been built expressly for the purpose of annihilating them. Also taken to the camps were 
homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, communists, and gypsies. Those who were not killed upon 
arrival fought to survive against disease, brutality, starvation, and overwork.43 
Prisoners in the camps commonly hid away small scraps of bread among their 
possessions. The precious bread crusts could mean the difference between life and death if 
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untoward events brought a person to the brink of starvation. A crust thief was seen by the 
inmates as equivalent to a murderer and would be killed if caught. 
Knowing the risks, bread thieves would target not the strong but the weak, who would be 
less likely to fight back or take revenge, or ideally a person who might die that day, leaving the 
theft undiscovered. Yet the entire group was sufficiently outraged by such theft that they would 
take turns staying up at night to stand guard. Such lookout duty had a serious cost, for it meant 
that the person would be in poorer condition for the coming day’s grueling work, and poor 
performance might mean execution, but the commitment to catching and punishing those who 
victimized the weak was thought to outweigh the personal cost. 
There were some prisoners who for whatever reason mistreated their fellows or even 
actively participated in torturing them, sometimes to death. The German SS who controlled the 
camps had no inclination to punish such acts. In fact, prisoners known to be cruel to their fellow 
prisoners were protected. Behind the scenes, however, prisoner justice was at work, and the 
protected “creatures” were often killed, commonly by prisoners who had not been their victims, 
had nothing personal to gain, and who put themselves at risk in doing so. One of the malevolent 
prisoners, Gregory Kushnir-Kushnarev, who claimed to be a former Russian general, was 
protected by the SS, but when he fell ill and went to the camp doctor (a fellow prisoner), the 
doctor by prearrangement declared him to be infectious and admitted him to the hospital, where 
other prisoners killed him by lethal injection. 
Why should these prisoners, typically the strongest with the best chances of survival, 
endanger themselves to punish wrongdoing to others? 
In 1719, Captain William Snelgrave was in charge of a merchant ship that was captured 
by a band of pirates.44 The quartermaster of the pirates interviewed Snelgraves’s crew to 
determine whether Snelgrave had been a just captain, with plans to kill him if he was not. By 
evening the crew had been interviewed and Snelgrave was found to be an excellent captain and 
was to be spared. The pirates’ boatswain did not agree with the decision and during the night 
tried to kill Snelgrave. When the attack was reported, the pirate crew, all of whom liked the 
boatswain, “voted for his being whip’d.”45 
Captain Snelgrave, as their prisoner, was nothing to the pirates, someone they would 
never see again. The boatswain was a well-liked colleague, whom they would continue to live 
with. Yet the group chose to punish the latter because of his mistreatment of the former. He 
deserved it for his violation, and his punishment was the only way to set things right. 
In the early 1840s, the tantalizing prospect of free land, together with a stagnant 
American economy, induced thousands of families to travel across the continent along the 
Oregon Trail to California, Utah, and Oregon. Wagon trains formed in Independence, Missouri, 
during the winter, where they worked out agreements concerning leadership, supplies, and 
finances. The pioneers could not begin their trek until the grass that would feed the animals 
along the way began to sprout. At a rate of three miles per hour and with no delays, a train could 
make the 2,000-mile journey before the autumn snows blocked the mountain passes. But falling 
behind schedule could mean disaster. People trapped in the mountains could die without food or 
shelter, or be forced to retreat back across the prairie in hopes of reaching an army post where 
they could survive the winter. 
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In the early weeks of the trip, some trains would try resting on the Sabbath, but the 
practice rarely lasted. Sunday travel was not optional if the schedule was to be kept. When 
people died on the trail, the bodies would roll along with the train until a long-enough stop gave 
time to dig a grave. When a person was too ill to travel, the group was forced to choose between 
abandoning the sick or delaying travel. Being separated from the train was a serious risk because 
it meant the loss of group contributions to everyday tasks, help with emergencies, and protection 
from attack. Yet the importance of moving was such that the sick were commonly left behind 
with only their family to stay with them, with hopes that another train might come along soon. 
Sidney Smith, for example, was seriously wounded when he accidentally shot himself. “We were 
on the hunting ground of the Caws, the Pawnees were daily expected and the Cumanches were 
prowling around the neighborhood. To remain, therefore, in our present encampment, until Smith 
could travel without pain and danger, was deemed certain death to all.” The train kept moving. 
Smith survived the first day of travel, but keeping him alive slowed the progress. The group 
finally decided to split up, with only a smaller group traveling at Smith’s slower pace. (The 
slower group eventually gave up and returned east.) 
With this understanding of the dramatic costs of delay, it is striking that one of the few 
things that would prompt a train to voluntarily stop was for the trial and punishment of serious 
wrongdoing. Each train made up its own rules. There was no U.S. legal authority present, and 
indeed the trains were not on U.S. territory during much of their travel. They dealt with serious 
wrongdoing according to the group’s own shared intuitions of justice.46 Perhaps most striking, it 
was not uncommon for a different train to stop to participate as the jury for a defendant who had 
nothing to do with them. Abigail Jane Scott recorded a case in which her train delayed for a day 
to participate in the trial of a man from a train ahead of them. The facts presented at the trial 
revealed that,  
 
Dunmore followed [Olmstead] and jumping upon him commenced beating him 
and endeavored to kick him in the face with his boots; Olmsted called upon the 
bystanders to take him off saying at the same time that he had a k[n]ife; As no one 
interfered he stabbed him in the lower part of the chest; Upon this Dunmore started back 
and exclaimed that he was stabbed. He fell and in twenty minutes was a corpse.47 
 
The group judged Olmstead to be blameless, as having acted in proper self-defense, and 
no liability was imposed. 
When James Reed, later to be a member of the infamous Donner Party (which resorted to 
cannibalism), beat another man over the head with a bullwhip, the leaders of the train convened a 
court and found him guilty of assault. Their choices for a sanction were limited. Rather than 
killing Reed, the makeshift court agreed to banish him. They decreed that he must travel alone 
and without firearms. Killing him outright seemed too severe to them, but sending him off with 
no weapon certainly put him at risk. While the company punished Reed, they agreed to take 
responsibility for the welfare of Reed’s family. 
Again, we see people undertaking at the cost of serious risk—be it delaying the train, or 
incurring the wrath of the concentration camp guards—to do justice in cases where they were not 
a victim, and perhaps not even part of the victim’s family or associates. Yet the people seem 
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more than willing to make the sacrifice or to suffer the risk. Why would humans have such an 
inclination? 
The evolutionary story of humans suggests an explanation. Recall the discussion of the 
serious hurdles that faced early human groups. At minimum, maintaining the all-important social 
cooperation required some check on such conduct as physical aggression and taking of 
possessions without consent. A member who was regularly victimized would hardly be likely to 
be an enthusiastic contributor to the group’s goals, which typically required not just cohesion but 
cooperation, be it in hunting or agriculture. And that high level of cooperation had to be 
maintained if the comparatively small and weak humans were to survive their larger predators 
and nature’s other hardships. 
Some shared understandings among the members would have had to exist as to the basic 
rules of conduct. But even if a group came to agreement on rules of conduct, the real challenge 
would come when the group had to deal with a member who violated those rules. Where social 
pressures were insufficient to gain compliance, the most readily available means of punishing the 
improper physical violence or unconsented-to taking was, well, physical violence or 
unconsented-to taking.48 
One can see the problem: How is a group to distinguish the “bad” beating or taking (of a 
rule violation) from the “good” beating or taking (of deserved punishment)? An effective 
enforcement system required not only a shared understanding of the prohibitions but also of the 
circumstances under which the prohibitions could be set aside in order to punish. 
And even that was not enough. Cooperation was not likely to be maintained if trivial 
violations were punished brutally or particularly harmful violations were punished lightly. The 
punishment of any member held a potential cost for the group (for example, the violator who is 
beaten may for a time be a less effective hunter), thus there was value in punishing no more than 
was necessary. Yet it was also important to signal the relative seriousness of different sorts of 
violations. It was an important message, for example, to understand that the improper killing of 
another was even worse than the improper beating of the person. Thus, there had to be a shared 
understanding of both a continuum of seriousness among the violations and a corresponding 
continuum of seriousness of punishments, which then allowed the two to be matched.49 
Although it is prehistory, we can guess that early human groups must have sorted out 
some such understandings, for we know that they flourished. Perhaps these shared 
understandings sharpened as their level of cooperative action heightened. It is hard to imagine a 
story by which such high cooperation could have developed and been maintained if there had 
been arbitrary punishment disconnected from the seriousness of the violation. 
As we have seen previously, it is usually not the case that human traits pop out of 
nowhere. They commonly are built upon more rudimentary forms of the trait in animals further 
down the evolutionary tree. This was true with regard to the use of punishment for harmful 
conduct, as we saw in chapter 3. And it is perhaps no surprise, then, to learn that many animals, 
especially the more social ones, also display rudimentary forms of a sense of fairness and justice. 
This is especially true of animals that live in cooperative groups.50 Treatment perceived as unfair 
tends to provoke an unhappy response, one that one can easily imagine would undermine the 
animal’s cooperative spirit within the group. 
In an experiment with capuchin monkeys, for example, monkeys within sight of one 
another were regularly given cucumber slices in exchange for granite tokens. When the 
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experimenter began to provide one monkey with a grape (a more highly valued food) in 
exchange for the same token that continued to yield mere cucumbers for the other monkey, the 
cucumber monkey often manifested considerable distress. It sometimes jumped up and down, 
even throwing the token or the cucumber at the researcher.51 The capuchin could see the 
disparity of value in its reward and was sufficiently upset by it to reject the “unfair” reward.52 
Similarly, chimpanzees often refuse to participate in an exchange once another chimpanzee is 
receiving a more valued reward for the same amount of effort.53 Thus, both capuchins and 
chimpanzees behave in ways suggesting that they can perceive unfairness and that it often 
physically stresses them. 
Behavior suggesting an ability to perceive fairness and unfairness underlies a great deal 
of social behavior in primates. Many primates regularly engage in sophisticated cooperation 
schemes, ranging from simple reciprocal grooming and food sharing to complex tool using and 
coalitional behavior, and an individual’s participation in the activity is commonly dependent 
upon being perceived as making a fair contribution. In olive baboons, for example, there is a 
strong correlation between the support a baboon has given to another in an earlier conflict and 
the willingness of that other baboon to return the favor by giving support in a present conflict.54 
In macaques, similarly, individuals often support others unrelated to them if such others have 
previously supported them in a conflict.55 Vervet monkeys tend to prefer to groom individuals 
who have groomed them in the past.56 When a chimpanzee grooms another early in the day, the 
other is more likely to share food with the groomer later in the day.57 And chimpanzees engaged 
in tasks that require collaboration quickly determine which among different potential partners is 
the best collaborator and will recruit that individual for subsequent collaborative tasks.58 
Primatologists report that, because sharing and other cooperative behavior exists in a “multi-
faceted matrix of relationships, social pressures, delayed rewards, and mutual obligations,”59 
successful individuals are those who best distinguish good colleagues from bad, and deal with 
each accordingly. 
Echoing the evolutionary speculation above, a failure to make a fair contribution to the 
group cannot just produce less help from others but also risks the imposition of punishment by 
the group, a fact that alcalde Rogers in the mining camp might have been wise to consider before 
taking Sim’s bribe. Rhesus macaques who discover food and are caught having failed to alert the 
group to the discovery, for example, often become targets of significant aggression.60 In 
chimpanzee societies, those reluctant to share their food are more likely to encounter aggressive 
responses when they later approach those who have food.61 Chimpanzees will attack former 
allies who failed to assist them in conflicts with third parties.62 And many primates, including 
chimpanzees, tend to intervene most often against those who have most often intervened against 
them.63 
Among chimpanzees (who, along with bonobos, are the closest relatives of humans) such 
retribution is common enough that researchers consider it “an integral part of [a] system of 
reciprocity.”64 Frans de Waal, a prominent primatologist, describes the chimpanzee community 
as “a ‘market’ of reward and punishment,”65 with “balance sheets” kept on social interactions.66 
The group’s rules consist not only of “one good turn deserves another” but also “an eye for an 
eye, a tooth for a tooth.”67 “Not only are beneficial actions rewarded,” de Waal reports, but 
“there seems to be a tendency to teach a lesson to those who act negatively.”68 Reward good 
deeds and punish bad. And not only do cooperative animals punish, but the intensity of the 
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punishment often increases with the severity of harm caused by the transgressor,69 again echoing 
the evolutionary analysis above. 
To summarize, the leading animal researchers believe that evolution has supplied the 
“building blocks” of human morality.70 The question is not whether biology has influenced the 
development of the human moral system, but rather to what degree.71 “Evolution,” they believe, 
“has produced the requisites for morality: a tendency to develop social norms and enforce 
them.”72 
The larger point here is that humans’ judgments about justice are not just modern social 
preferences but an innate part of human nature. One of the most compelling demonstrations of 
this is found in scientific studies of child development. Children around the world in every 
culture, and in every demographic within a culture, follow a common path in the development of 
moral reasoning and an appreciation for basic principles of justice. And much of this occurs at an 
extremely early age, even before children have the tools to learn social norms (let alone to learn 
governmental legal rules). Much of our intuitions of justice are the preprogrammed product of a 
process of development that largely transcends a human’s environment. 
There is a great deal of evidence,73 for example, in support of Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
classic scheme describing a predictable sequence of stages in the development of moral 
thinking.74 He suggests three discrete stages of development, each stage with two levels.75 It is 
“the most widely researched description of moral development available,”76 but it does not 
matter whether one accepts exactly his phase descriptions or even divides up the development 
process as he does. The important point for our purposes is that there is general agreement across 
the entire field of child development that children everywhere progress through the same stages 
and at roughly the same ages.77 And this developmental flowering exists across all cultures, not 
just Western ones, including across cultures in which the existing legal regimes are dramatically 
different.78 
Interestingly, while even the early research suggested that children were precocious in 
their development of moral reasoning, in fact we now know that those studies vastly 
underestimated the sophistication of even very young children. Indeed, many authorities suggest 
it is likely that research still has not fully revealed the precociousness of moral reasoning.79 
According to the recent literature, “moral capacity is well developed, although by no means 
completely developed, in the third year of life,”80 when most children are barely verbal.  
In one early experiment, for example, very young children’s beliefs about justice were 
tested to determine if they make distinctions between violations of moral rules—acts that are 
wrong and deserve punishment (for example, one child hitting another)—and violations of 
conventional rules—acts that deviate from a convention (for example, failing to say grace before 
a snack).81 Using pictures of offending conduct and a pictorial scale of punishment (different-
size frowns), the researchers showed that even children between two-and-a-half and three-and-a-
half years old make such distinctions and would punish a moral offense more seriously than the 
violation of a convention, even if “there was no rule about [the moral offense].”82 
In another study, four-year-olds, both middle-class European-Americans and lower-
socioeconomic African-Americans, judged moral transgressions relating to physical or 
psychological harm and fairness as very serious, as deserving of punishment, and as 
generalizably wrong, and saw this as so regardless of whether they had ever been told of a rule 
that the conduct was prohibited.83 In short, even young children seem to have textured and 
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specific views about deserved punishment, and those views are not simply derived from the 
dictates of authority. 
The importance of these results should not be underestimated. The fact that such young 
children believe immoral acts are wrong even in the absence of rules indicates a precocious, 
universalist view of morality.84 Further, given that such conceptual distinctions are made by very 
young children, especially universally, it is not likely that they are acquired by social learning 
processes, but more likely that they are the product of an innate human developmental 
sequence.85 
Another striking illustration of how much human judgments of justice can transcend a 
person’s situation and upbringing is found in social psychology studies showing people’s shared 
judgments of justice. There is an enormous range in human conditions and experience around the 
world. There is also an enormous range of governmental law and an enormous difference in the 
ability of different populations (with dramatically different educational levels, for example) to 
understand that law, and enormous difference in the willingness of different peoples to give 
deference and to internalize governmental law (note, for example, that different governments 
have very different reputations with their people). Yet despite this wide range in human 
conditions and experiences and the wide range of governments and governmental law, the 
studies show that people across cultures and demographics share strong common judgments on 
many aspects of justice. 
Cross-cultural studies have shown great similarity in ranking offense seriousness, for 
example. At the end of a particularly large cross-cultural study, one researcher concluded, “If 
one were to order the acts according to the proportions of each country sample criminalizing 
them, one would find a general consensus across all countries as to the extent that all acts should 
be tolerated.”86 And “it is apparent that there was considerable agreement as to the amount of 
punishment appropriate to each act”87 and that looking at relative rankings indicates “general 
agreement in ranks across all countries.”88 
Indeed, the studies suggest that people are not simply looking to governmental law to 
form their judgments of justice, but in many instances are not reasoning out their judgments at 
all. The studies suggest that they commonly rely on their intuitions rather than on conscious 
reasoning.89 That is, they are not calculating out the relative blameworthiness of the offender but 
rather are experiencing his relative blameworthiness as if it were a fact. (The studies show these 
shared intuitions can be quite nuanced, taking account of a wide range of factors and even their 
interactive effect.) And these intuitions of justice are widely shared across demographics 
especially in relation to the core of wrongdoing—judgments involving physical aggression and 
takings without consent.90 
The claim is not that people agree on the precise amount of punishment that is 
appropriate for a particular crime, but rather on the relative seriousness of one crime compared to 
another. In one study (by one of the present authors), the researchers gave participants twenty-
four short scenarios, each describing a different criminal episode. The participants were then 
asked to rank the scenarios—which included crimes such as theft, assault, burglary, robbery, 
kidnapping, rape, manslaughter, murder, and torture—in order of how much punishment was 
deserved for each.91 Not only did the participants agree that serious wrongdoing should be 
punished and that minor infractions should not, but they showed almost unanimous agreement on 
the relative ranking of the blameworthiness shown in the twenty-four different scenarios.  
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And this high level of agreement existed across all demographic differences among the 
study’s participants. The level of agreement was strongest for crimes involving physical 
aggression, theft, and deception, which are the crimes most commonly committed. Unanimity is 
lost and the level of agreement decreases as the nature of the offense moves out from the core 
offenses toward a periphery of more culturally-dependent offenses, such as those concerning 
religion, family, and some sexual practices. 
The high agreement of intuitions across cultures and demographics for many aspects of 
core offenses makes it clear that people’s intuitions of justice transcend governmental law. Even 
though laws vary across countries, people’s intuitions of justice on many issues do not. 
That many aspects of humans’ judgments of justice transcend culture and situation helps 
explain much of what we see in the absent-law cases. It should be no surprise that the California 
gold miners, the seventeenth-century Caribbean pirates, the Nazi concentration camp prisoners, 
wagon train members on the Oregon Trail, and the residents of San Francisco in the 1850s all 
demonstrate a commitment to doing justice, even if at personal cost to themselves, even when 
they are far beyond the reach of governmental law. Their commitment to doing justice is in large 
part what comes in the package of being human. 
But some people will argue that what we see in absent-law situations is not a product of 
human nature but just the residual effects of what governmental law has taught. While the law 
itself may no longer have a direct effect, the people in the absent-law situations are still carried 
forward by its momentum and, as if out of habit, act upon the norms that governmental law has 
taught and that they have internalized. 
But this view runs up against the scientifically confirmed reality just reviewed: the cross-
cultural studies showing agreement on many aspects of justice judgments even though different 
cultures’ legal rules vary widely; the child development studies showing a common path of 
moral development impervious to all environmental factors, let alone governmental law; animal 
studies showing the precursors to human notions of justice and fairness; and the evolutionary 
analysis showing the necessity for such shared intuitions for group success long before 
government or law was a thought in the human mind. How could one find such shared intuitions 
of justice around the world, a common path in the development of a child’s moral views, and the 
precursors to justice judgments in our evolutionary predecessors, if our punishment judgments 
are simply the product of what we have learned from governmental law? 
Even the absent-law stories themselves refute the claim of governmental law’s dominant 
role. Some of the absent-law groups, such as the Netsilik people, which we will discuss in 
chapter 6, had no prior governmental law that could be learned and internalized, yet they show 
the classic patterns of cooperation and just punishment. Other absent-law groups adopt norms 
dramatically different from those that their prior governmental law provided. The legal rules that 
governed British sailors, for example, were dramatically different from those that the pirates 
created for themselves—and, interestingly, the pirates rules were much like the rules constructed 
by other absent-law groups in other centuries and in other parts of the world. Further, there is 
reason to doubt that some of the absent-law groups had ever internalized the prior governmental 
rules. Certainly this is an open question with regard to such groups as those who chose to 
become pirates or the felons of Attica prison, to be discussed in the next chapter. 
But perhaps the most compelling reason to reject the argument that the absent-law groups 
are simply carrying forward norms previously instantiated by governmental law is seen in the 
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enormous diversity of the situations from which the groups are drawn. They are from many 
different centuries across many parts of the world and drawn from demographics of every sort. 
The prior formal law for the different groups could not be more different, yet we see common 
patterns of social cooperation and just punishment. If it was governmental law’s prior normative 
influence at work, we would expect to see that same diversity in how the groups conduct 
themselves.92 
A more parsimonious explanation, which fits the evidence, both scientific and anecdotal, 
is that the deep desire for doing justice is a basic human trait that is shared across demographics 
and cultures, as are many of the specific principles of justice that people use in assessing 
deserved punishment. 
The nature of our judgments of justice is not just an academic question, but rather is at 
the crux of many of today’s penal policy debates. If our interest in doing justice were just 
socially learned, then reformers need only reeducate us. Social reformers could make humans 
into any sort of creatures that they wished; they can create a population that does not care about 
doing justice and that is happy to give up the institution of punishment. Good luck with that. 
What the evidence suggests is that our interest in doing justice is an innate part of our 
character that has, over the course of 125,000 generations, become a fundamental part of what it 
is to be human. Attempts at “reeducation” would be difficult and costly, if not hopeless. Our 
basic instincts of justice are likely so deep that they cannot be altered, at least not without using 
coercive indoctrination processes that no liberal democracy would tolerate. 
Of course, understanding that the human inclination toward just punishment has an innate 
biological component does not in itself mean that we ought to follow that human urge wherever 
it leads. Things have changed for humans since our time on the Serengeti Plain. Its innateness 
does not make it right, or even good for us as a society. While we cannot change it, perhaps we 
will want to keep it within newly defined bounds. But as part II of the book shows, it turns out 
125,000 human generations of evolution have given us some precious wisdom, and there is a 
serious cost to be paid by ignoring the importance of our shared intuitions of justice. 
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(age range) 
Stage Description of Moral Behavior 
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Exchange 
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This includes beneficial exchanges with others.  
 
Conventional 
(10–14) 
Good/Bad 
Behave so as to elicit approval from others.  
 
Law and 
Order 
Behave so as to discharge one’s duty as part of the 
social order. 
 
Postconventional 
(14–adult) 
Social 
Contract 
Acting in a way that benefits others because of 
rationally based laws/norms in a society. Individual 
rights and utilitarianism.  
 
“Universal 
ethical 
principle 
orientation” 
“Right is defined by the decision of conscience in 
accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing 
to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and 
consistency.” 
 
(Quotations from Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development, vol. 1, 165, are 
used for the stage name and description because it is difficult to gloss these ideas. Emphasis in 
the description original.) Kohlberg argued that people universally progressed from lower to 
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ages fourteen onward, includes a genuine interest in others’ welfare, a respect for others’ rights, 
and a recognition of universal moral principles. More recent approaches to Kohlberg’s model 
maintain the idea that stages are reached in sequence, but instead of one stage “replacing” 
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LIVING BEYOND THE LAW: A SUMMARY 
 
Narrative Line Chapters and Primary Stories 
 
 The daily carnage and conflict we see in the 
world around us suggest that humans are by nature 
at best self-interested and at worst predators. It is 
the civilizing influence of government and law, the 
common wisdom tells us, that provides the limited 
stability that we do enjoy. But recent science 
suggests a different view of human nature and, 
thereby, may suggest a different effect of 
governmental law.  
 What is our human nature?  If we could see 
human groups operating outside the influence of 
civilized society, its government, and its laws, we 
might know.  And luckily, the diversity and 
unpredictability of human history and experience 
give us a collection of naturally-occurring 
experiments by which we can answer the question.  
As it turns out, the answers have dramatic 
implications for shaping civilization’s modern 
institutions. 
1. What Is Our Nature? What Does 
Government Do for Us, and to Us? 
 Illustrative stories include a Los 
Angeles preschool-graduation parents’ 
brawl and a Miami T-ball game parents’ 
melee. 
 
PART I. HUMAN RULES 
 Contrary to common wisdom, humans are 
not purely self-interested, but rather are naturally 
inclined toward cooperation—as long as they are 
not being taken advantage of by others. And it is 
this natural inclination toward cooperation that 
accounts for the extraordinary success of the human 
species against great odds. 
2. Cooperation: Lepers and Pirates  
 Illustrative stories include the 
1867 forcible exile of lepers to a 
permanent colony on Molokai island, 
Hawaii; the 1972 plane crash in the 
Andes Mountains that led to 
cannibalism; and self-regulation among 
the pirates of the Caribbean in the 
1700s. 
 
 But the critical benefits of cooperative 
action are available only with the adoption of rules 
and a system for punishing violations of those rules. 
Rather than an evil system anathema to right-
thinking people, punishment is the linchpin for the 
benefits of cooperative action that have created 
human success. 
3. Punishment: Drop City and the 
Utopian Communes 
 Illustrative stories include the 
utopian anti-punishment hippie 
communes of the late 1960s. 
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 It is part of human nature to see doing 
justice as a value in itself—in people’s minds not 
dependent for justification on the practical benefits 
it brings. Doing justice is so important to people 
that they willingly suffer enormous costs to obtain 
it, even when they were neither hurt by the wrong 
nor stand to directly benefit from punishing the 
wrongdoer. 
4. Justice: 1850s San Francisco and 
the California Gold Rush  
 Illustrative stories include 
California gold miners in 1848–1851; 
San Francisco vigilante committees of 
1851; Nazi concentration camps of the 
1940s; and wagon trains for westward 
migration in America beginning in the 
1840s. 
 
 However, it is not punishment itself that 
people demand and that promotes and sustains 
cooperative action, but rather just punishment. The 
same human desire to have justice done includes a 
natural distaste for injustice. 
5. Injustice: The Attica Uprising and 
the Batavia Shipwreck  
 Illustrative stories include the 
1971 prisoner takeover of Attica Prison 
in New York and the 1628 wreck of the 
Batavia on islands off Australia. 
 
 On the other hand, while doing justice and 
avoiding injustice are important, they are not 
everything. Emergency conditions, especially the 
need to survive, can subvert them. But even when 
subverted, the desire to do justice and avoid 
injustice is not lost. It commonly spontaneously 
returns when conditions permit. 
6. Survival: The Inuits of King 
William Land and the Mutineers on 
Pitcairn Island 
 Illustrative stories include the 
Netsilik Inuits living in the extreme 
conditions of far northern Canada in the 
1900s; the mutineers from the HMS 
Bounty who settled on isolated Pitcairn 
Island in 1790; and the escaped slaves 
on Jamaica who, in the 1700s, formed 
themselves into hidden communities 
known as the Maroons. 
 
 How can it be, then, that we see a world full 
of conflict and injustice that seems to contradict any 
notion of a human inclination toward cooperation 
and justice? Again, the absent-law natural 
experiments reveal much about how things can go 
wrong. Most prominently, the exercise of authority 
seen as illegitimate, as not acting in the group’s 
interests, can alienate and subvert cooperative 
action rather than build it. 
  
 As part II explains, these and other lessons 
about human nature have serious implications for 
shaping modern institutions, especially the criminal 
justice system by which we seek to control 
wrongdoing among people. 
 
7. Subversion: Prison Camps and 
Hellships  
 Illustrative stories include World 
War II Japanese prisoner camps in the 
Philippines; subsequent transport of 
prisoners to the main islands in the 
“Hellships”; and the 1864 wreck of two 
ships—Grafton and Invercauld—on the 
same Auckland island, with the two 
groups, unknown to one another, 
handling the crisis very differently. 
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PART II. MODERN LESSONS 
 Given the human nature revealed in part I, it 
is no surprise to find that social science confirms 
that people across demographics and cultures 
broadly share certain intuitions of justice and that a 
criminal law that adopts rules and practices that 
conflict with those shared intuitions is one that loses 
moral credibility with the community it governs. 
The research also shows that that loss is disastrous 
for effective crime control, because it undermines 
the law’s potentially powerful influence in gaining 
deference as a moral authority and in shaping and 
internalizing norms. Without credibility, the system 
prompts resistance and subversion rather than 
support and acquiescence. 
8. Credibility: America’s Prohibition 
 Illustrative stories include 1920s 
American Prohibition; and lawless 
northern Pakistan in 1990. 
 
 Is modern criminal law in danger of losing 
moral credibility with the community it governs? 
Clearly yes. It routinely adopts criminal law rules 
and practices that regularly produce results so 
unjust as to seriously conflict with the community’s 
intuitions of justice. While these doctrines are 
commonly promoted by politicians as good for 
fighting crime, they in fact hurt effective crime 
control by undermining the system’s moral 
credibility and thereby its social influence with the 
community. 
9. Excess: Committing Felony 
Murder While Asleep in Bed and Life 
in Prison for an Air-Conditioning 
Fraud 
 Illustrative stories include a 
Florida case in which twenty-year-old 
Ryan Holle is given life without parole 
for lending his car to a roommate who 
uses it to help commit a robbery while 
Ryan is home asleep; and a Texas case 
in which William Rummel gets a life 
sentence for a minor $130 fraud. 
 
 At the same time, the criminal justice system 
regularly adopts criminal law rules and practices 
that predictably produce failures of justice that 
similarly seriously conflict with community views. 
These are commonly promoted as needed to protect 
personal rights, but they do so without an 
appreciation for how the system’s resulting loss of 
credibility damages crime control. Doing justice 
may at times have to be compromised to protect 
rights, but it ought to be done only when and to the 
extent necessary—a dramatic change from current 
practice. 
10. Failure: Getting Away with 
Murder Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
 Illustrative stories include an 
Illinois case in which Larry Eyler, a 
serial torturer-murderer of young gay 
men, is released to kill despite 
overwhelming evidence of his guilt 
because a police officer held him for 
questioning for too long; and a 
Kentucky case in which Melvin 
Ignatow’s hidden photos of himself 
committing torture-murder are 
discovered, but he can’t be prosecuted 
even though he had earlier perjured his 
way to an acquittal. 
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 A loss of moral credibility is disastrous not 
only because it undermines effective crime control 
but also because of where that loss can lead. Once 
enforcement falls below a critical point that allows 
criminal elements to corrupt or threaten the process 
itself, there is no easy way back to stability and 
governmental control without infringing on liberties 
in the most serious way, dramatically more than 
would have been required to avoid the problem in 
the first place. 
11. Collapse: Escobar’s Colombia 
 Illustrative stories include drug-
trafficker kingpin Pablo Escobar’s 
taking control of the Colombian 
government in the 1980s, and what was 
required to regain governmental control. 
 
 The criminal justice system need not be 
stuck with its current sketchy reputation. It can 
change the way it does business by committing 
itself above all else to doing justice and avoiding 
injustice. 
 As part I makes clear, that change is not just 
another in a long line of modern innovations, but 
rather a return to what human groups did before the 
advent of government and law. It is not a modern 
reform at all but rather returning us closer to the 
way humans dealt with one another before modern 
reforms disconnected us from one another and from 
our human nature. 
 Five specific proposals are offered, which 
logically follow from the analyses in part II. 
12. Taking Justice Seriously: Five 
Proposals  
1. Purge the criminal justice system of 
rules and practices that give offenders 
more punishment than they deserve.  
2. Purge the criminal justice system of 
rules and practices that subvert having 
justice done.  
3. See the big picture: Set punishment 
according to an offender’s 
blameworthiness as compared to other 
offenses and offenders.  
4. Create or designate a public body—a 
justice commission—to both promote 
justice and fight injustice. 
5. Regularly ask whether the present 
community’s judgment might be wrong. 
 
 Epilogue: What Are They Doing 
Now? 
 Picks up each of the book’s 
stories where it left off and tells what 
has happened to the people since. 
 
 
